It has long been recognised that the flexibility of production lies at the heart of the distinction between Bertrand and Cournot models. The most natural application of the Cournot model would seem to be in the case where output is fixed in the short run. The Bertrand framework rests on the fact that output is fully variable in the short run so that if one firm is undercut by another, the lower-priced firm can expand output to serve all the demand. It is this basic insight that we explore. We present a general model in which the flexibility of production is endogenous, and which embraces both the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes as possibilities. This enables us to see which outcomes will emerge from firms' strategic decisions, rather than presupposing either.
In Section III we expand the firm's strategy set to include the type of precommitment, so that its choice embraces all three types of supply functions.' When firms' strategy sets are expanded in this way there are two types of equilibria (see Theorem). One equilibrium occurs when all firms precommit both factors of production, yielding the Cournot outcome. Another equilibrium occurs if one or more firms precommit neither factor of production, when the equilibrium price equals minimum average cost, the Bertrand outcome.
In Section IV we briefly discuss the impact of uncertainty, imperfect competition in the market stage, and entry. The result that the Cournot outcome is a metagame equilibrium is fairly robust with respect to noncompetitive assumption about the market stage (i.e. Cournot, conjectural variations).
I. PRECOMMITMENT AND MARKET OUTCOME
We present the basic model, deriving the market outcome when the precommitment of firms is given. When a firm precommits a factor of production, it places an upper bound on the amount of the factor that it can employ in the market stage. The ith firm's capital and labour Li, ki are used to produce output xi. Firms can be of three types depending on whether they precommit one, both, or neither factor of production. The precommitment type of the firm is represented by a discrete variable yi, which equals 0, 1, or 2 when the firm precommits neither, one, or both factors respectively. There are two stages to the model. In the first strategic stage firms precommit the relevant factor(s) of production, which determine(s) the firms' supply functions. Given these supply functions, in the market stage a competitive equilibrium occurs. Throughout this paper we shall make the following primitive assumptions about technology and demand. All functions are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.
A 21: Technology. Firms have the same constant returns production function f(ki, Li) which is strictly concave in ki and Li.
A 22: Industry Demand. F(p) is bounded from above, strictly decreasing when positive, and there exists price p* > 0 such that F(p) = 0 when p > p*.
Neither of these assumptions is as general as it could be, and they are chosen to keep the model simple. Under constant returns to scale there is an efficient least average cost of production, denoted hereafter as a. We assume that p* > a. We shall now examine the firm's choice of supply function in the first stage for each of the three types of firm.
(a) Total Precommitment, 'yi =2. When a firm precommits both factors in the strategic stage, it effectively chooses its capacity x?, and is free to choose its output from the interval [0, x?] during the market stage. The costs of 1 The model presented contrasts with other work on supply correspondence equilibria where the firm's choice of supply correspondence is very much wider, as in Grossman (1981) , Hart (1982) . In the strategic metagame the set of supply functions that the firm can have is directly related to the firm's cost structure in the market stage. production are entirely fixed, with zero marginal cost up to capacity. The capacity can be expressed in terms of the capital stock chosen, since it will never pay a firm to precommit its capital and labour in any ratio other than the optimal labour-capital ratio (otherwise it could have the same capacity at a lower cost). The cost minimising output-capital ratio, denoted v, does not depend on output because of constant returns:
We define the firm's capacity-constrained supply function so as: Whereas in the case of total precommitment the firm chooses a vertical supply function, in the strategic investment case the supply function under Al will be upward sloping, its position determined by the capital stock of the firm. There are thus three types of supply function that the firm might have, depending on its precommitment type yi.
There are n firms with given precommitment types yi. For firms which precommit one or both factors, the choice of supply function can be represented by their choice of capital stock in the strategic stage (see (2) and (6) 
where 0 = 0(k, y). We can omit the term for the ith firm's profits when yi =0, since from (10) its profits will then be zero.
II. EQUILIBRIUM WITH IMPOSED PRECOMMITMENT
This section briefly explores the types of equilibrium which result when the type of precommitment is given, but the firm is free to choose the level of precommitment. The firms choose ki, but not yi.
(a) y = 2: Nash Equilibrium in Capacities. If all firms precommit both factors, then we have an industry where firms choose capacities in the strategic stage. In this case S(p, k, 2) = vZki from (9), and for vZki < F(0), 0(k, 2) = F-'(vEki) from (10), so that:
But of course (12) Dixon (1985a) , to which the reader is referred for a more detailed analysis. When y = 1, the industry supply function is S(p, k, 1) = s(p) ki. The payoff function in the case of strategic investment is:
Should an equilibrium exist,2 it will be symmetric under Al. The equilibrium capitals and price are denoted (ks, Os). The properties of interest in the strategic investment equilibrium are:
Properties of (ks, Os). 
III. VOLUNTARY PRECOMMITMENT IN THE STRATEGIC METAGAME
In this section we treat precommitment type yi as a decision variable of the firm. In essence, the firm chooses the type of supply function it will have by its decision of which factors it will precommit. The firm's strategy space is expanded to of the firms to Ai in R':
ki is restricted to 0 when yi = 0. The Metagame [Ai, Ui: i = 1,... n] thus encompasses the three cases considered in section II. Before outlining the formal structure of the strategic metagame we shall briefly discuss how the firm might precommit its inputs. Consider the choice between total and partial precommitment. Since we are dealing with a voluntary fixed precommitment, the firm has to place upon itself a binding upper-bound on the labour employed in the market stage. If we interpret the labour input as men employed, the firm must prevent itself from being able to take people on during the market stage. A firm can clearly manage to 'bind' itself thus in a number of ways. Most importantly, it can determine its own organisation and operating rules which it cannot override except at a large cost to itself. Thus the firm can create an overly bureaucratic personnel department with complex and lengthy hiring procedures. The firm may impose a long (firm-specific) training period on newly hired individuals, or the firm can simply choose a particular labour hiring policy and embody this in the administrative structure and procedure of the firm. Such a policy might take THE COURNOT AND BERTRAND OUTCOMES 65 the form of manpower specifications per unit of plant (in our simple model, L = lak, where la is the optimal labour-capital ratio).
When we talk of the 'firm' thus precommitting itself, we can mean a variety of things. For example, we can conceive of top management delegating the firm's manpower policy to lower management, who by reason of incentives or preference will pursue efficiency in production, thus facilitating the strategic behaviour of the top management.3 Perhaps less plausibly shareholders can choose managers with a preference for such a manpower policy. Yet another possibility is that the 'firm' binds itself to a specific policy via collective bargaining: management and unions can agree on operating procedures, shift lengths, overtime and so on. Alternatively, we can interpret the precommitment of labour as occurring through the choice of a putty-clay technology as opposed to a putty-putty technology. This last interpretation does not fit in with the formal model actually presented here (since with total precommitment there are no variable costs in the market stage), but the results would still hold.
When we expand firms' strategy spaces to allow for the type of precommitment there are two types of equilibria in the resultant model: Cournot and Bertrand. However, before this is proven in the Theorem, we establish a crucial Lemma, which tells us that in some sense total precommitment is dominates partial precommitment:
LEMMA Let (k,y)eA, and 0(k,y) > a. If for some i yi = 1, ki > 0, then there exist some strategy (k0,2) such that given other firms' strategies k_j,_j: Uj(0 , k -i, 2, y -i) > Ui(k, zy).
Proof. Since 0 > a, firm i produces output kis(0) inefficiently. Hence the firm can increase its profits by totally precommitting itself to produce the same output efficiently: the market price given by (10) is unchanged, revenue is unchanged, costs fall and profits increase. Q.E.D.
For 0(k, y) > a, any strategy (ki, 1) is strictly dominated by some strategy (k0, 2). This is very important, since it implies that whenever firms earn positive profits (note Ui > 0 only if 0 > 0) they will choose to be totally precommitted to an inflexible production plan.
The Theorem demonstrates that there are two types of equilibrium (k*, y*) in the strategic metagame [Ai, Uj; i = 1,... , n]: one where all firms choose total precommitment so that y* =2 and hence k* = kc which yields the Cournot outcome, and one where at least one firm chooses yj = 0, which yields the Bertrand outcome. Q.E.D. The intuition behind the result is simple enough. The Cournot outcome occurs because firms will want to precommit both factors of production, since to precommit only capital will involve productive inefficiency, and no precommitment will condemn firms to zero profits. The second type of equilibrium yields the Bertrand outcome, and occurs because no firm can gain from precommitment, since production is efficient and any reduction in a firm's own output will be matched by a rise in the outputs of other firms which are uncommitted. Hence no one firm can prevent the zero profit Bertrand outcome.
That the Bertrand outcome is a metagame equilibrium depends crucially on two features of the model presented: the competitive market stage, and the imposition of constant returns to scale in Al. Even with a competitive market stage, the presence of diminishing returns will lead to the Cournot outcome as the unique metagame equilibrium. The Bertrand equilibrium depends on the fact that firms are willing to expand their own output as much as is necessary at the relevant price. However, with diminishing returns there is a well defined, upward sloping 'long-run' supply function. Thus if one firm totally precommits itself, it will be in the position of a monopolist with a competitive fringe, being able to increase profits by restricting output. The result that the Cournot outcome is a metagame equilibrium is more robust, and does not depend on a competitive market stage.
IV. UNCERTAINTY, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND ENTRY
If there is uncertainty, e.g. in factor prices or demand, there may be an additional cost to precommitment, since there is a reduction in the flexibility of production during the market subgame, which can impose a cost on the THE COURNOT AND BERTRAND OUTCOMES 67 firm. With sufficient uncertainty it is possible to construct examples in which partial precommitment is not dominated by total precommitment.5 In the previous sections it has been assumed that the market stage is competitive, at least in the sense that the price is determined so as to clear the output market given firms' supply functions. This section briefly discusses the alternative assumption that the market stage is played according to Cournot rules. In the market stage, the equilibrium will be determined by the firm's reaction functions, which in turn are determined by the firms cost function in the market stage. Thus with a Cournot market stage firms choose reaction functions rather than supply functions. The nature and level of precommitment will determine the firm's reaction function in the market stage. The analysis in this section is very brief indeed, and draws upon Brander and Spencer (1983), who analyse the strategic investment case with a Cournot market stage.
As in Section II, consider first the model with imposed precommitment. In the case of total precommitment (y = 2), the fact that the market stage is Cournot rather than competitive will make no difference to the overall equilibrium, which will be the standard one-shot Cournot outcome discussed in Section II (a). Since capital and labour are precommitted together, production will be efficient. Turning next to the case of no precommitment, the equilibrium is by definition the standard Cournot equilibrium. Unlike the model with a competitive market stage, there is no difference between the equilibrium outcome in the cases of total precommitment and no precommitment.
The strategic investment case with a Cournot market stage has already been analysed in great detail by Brander and Spencer (1983) .6 Precommitting capital has the effect of reducing costs in the market stage, and hence shifting the firms reaction function outwards. One implication of the market stage being Cournot instead of competitive is that in equilibrium productive inefficiency is due to over-capitalisation rather than under-capitalisation: there is more capital than required to minimise the costs of the outputs produced in equilibrium (this depends on the assumptions made: see Brander and Spencer (1983) p. 227, fn. 4, and Bulow et al. (1985) ).
What of the metagame equilibrium in reaction functions? Brander and Spencer consider the case where firms choose whether or not to precommit capital given that labour is uncommitted. They show that if firms choice of strategic precommitment is limited to the capital variable, then firms will choose to precommit capital.7 If we extend the firms' decision to allow precommitment of labour as well, then this becomes the dominant strategy. The structure of the argument is the same as in our Theorem: if the firm precommits only capital, then there will be a strategic inefficiency in production
